Perfectly Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences  by Blundo, Carlo et al.
Information and Computation 146, 123 (1998)
Perfectly Secure Key Distribution for
Dynamic Conferences
Carlo Blundo* and Alfredo De Santis*
Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Universita di Salerno,
84081 Baronissi (SA), Italy
Amir Herzberg and Shay Kutten
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York 10598
Ugo Vaccaro*
Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Universita di Salerno,
84081 Baronissi (SA), Italy
and
Moti Yung
CertCo, New York, New York 10004
In this paper we analyze perfectly secure key distribution schemes for
dynamic conferences. In this setting, any member of a group of t users
can compute a common key using only his private initial piece of informa-
tion and the identities of the other t&1 users in the group. Keys are
secure against coalitions of up to k users; that is, even if k users pool
together their pieces they cannot compute anything about a key of any
conference comprised of t other users. First we consider a noninteractive
model where users compute the common key without any interaction. We
prove the tight bound on the size of each user’s piece of information of
( k+t&1t&1 ) times the size of the common key. Then, we consider the model
where interaction is allowed in the common key computation phase and
show a gap between the models by exhibiting a one-round interactive
scheme in which the user’s information is only k+t&1 times the size of
the common key. Finally, we present its adaptation to network topologies
with neighbourhood constraints and to asymmetric (e.g., client-server)
communication models. ] 1998 Academic Press
Article No. IC982717
1 0890-540198 25.00
Copyright  1998 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
* Partially supported by Italian Ministry of University and Research (MURST) and by National
Council for Research (CNR).
1. INTRODUCTION
Key distribution is a central problem in cryptographic systems and is a major
component of the security subsystem of distributed systems, communication systems,
and data networks. The increase in bandwidth, size, usage, and applications of such
systems is likely to pose new challenges and to require novel ideas. A growing applica-
tion area in networking is ‘‘conferencing’’ where a group of entities (or network
locations) collaborate privately in an interactive procedure. In this work we consider
the basic case of perfectly secure key distribution for conferences. Note that key
distribution for two-party communication is a special case of conferences of size two.
If users of a group (which we call a conference) wish to communicate using sym-
metric encryption, they must share a common key. A key distribution scheme
(denoted KDS for short) is a method to distribute off-line initial private pieces of
information among a set of users, so that each group of a given size (or up to a given
size) can compute a common key for secure conference. This information is generated
and distributed by a trusted server which is active only at the distribution phase (like
in a set-up phase of a public-key (PK) system suggested by Diffie and Hellman [7]
and in contrast to on-line server-based key distribution schemes suggested by
Needham and Schroeder, where the server is on-line active at all times [21]).
Various key distribution schemes have been proposed so far, mainly to serve
pairs of users. A basic and straightforward perfectly secure scheme (which is useful
in small systems) consists of distributing initial keys to users in such a way that
each potential group of users shares a common key. In the case of common keys
for pairs of users, if n is the number of users, the server has to generate n(n&1)2
keys and each user holds n&1 keys, one for each possible communication. When
n gets large it becomes problematic or even impossible to manage all keys. This is
known as the n2 scheme. For conferences, when we allow all possible subsets of a
given size to join together (what we call the dynamic conference setting), the
number of keys becomes prohibitively large.
Given the high complexity of such a distribution mechanism, a natural step is to
trade complexity for security. We may still require that keys are perfectly secure,
but only with respect to an adversary controlling coalitions of a limited size. This
novel approach was initiated by Blom [3] for the case of conference of cardinality
two (other related schemes are given in [9, 11, 17]). We are motivated by Blom’s
(somewhat forgotten) pioneering work. We study key distribution for dynamic
conferences. Our scheme has two parameters: t, the size of the conference (group),
and k, the size of adversary coalitions. Another characteristic of such schemes is
whether they are interactive (users exchange messages during common-key estab-
lishment phase) or noninteractive. Note that interactive key distribution involves
only the users of the particular conference and is a one-time operation, in contrast
to practical schemes which involve a trusted server during repeatable conferences.
1.1. The Results
We give a precise model of our setting and then we analyze and design perfectly-
secure key distribution schemes for dynamic conferences. We show the following:
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1. Lower bound : We consider the noninteractive model and prove that the
size of the piece of a user’s information is at least ( k+t&1t&1 ) times the size of the
common key.
2. Matching upper bound : We propose a concrete scheme and show that it
indeed gives pieces of this size, thus establishing the optimality of the bound.
3. Gap : We compare the interactive to the noninteractive settings. We show
a one-round interactive scheme for distributing one conference key where the user’s
information is only t+k&1 times the size of the common key, proving a separation
between the interactive and the noninteractive cases.
4. Constrained communication-graph conferencing : We present modifications
of the schemes to systems in which conferences are generated according to neigh-
bourhood constraints (of the network communication graph).
5. Asymmetric communication model: We extend our results to an asymmetric
model where there are two types of users with one type having higher ‘‘rank’’ than the
other.
Our analysis deals with the generation of one key and it applies information
theory and its basic notions of entropy and mutual information, as well as their
conditional versions. In the Appendix we review these notions and present basic
equations that we use.
1.2. Related Work
The two common approaches to key distribution (different from the one in this
paper), which were taken in order to reduce the inherent complexity of the basic
straightforward n2 scheme, are schemes based on public-key cryptography (using
PK-cryptosystems or key-exchange protocols) [7] or on an on-line authentication
server [21]. Numerous suggestions for key distribution schemes based on compu-
tational assumptions in the above settings are known (e.g., [10, 13, 18, 20, 22,
2527]), as well as a number of suggestions for conference keys (e.g., [5, 14, 24]).
We remark that our approach is information theoretic (a one-time perfectly secure
distribution) and indeed differs from the above computational (more practical)
approaches. Yet, our bounds serve as foundations for the key distribution problem
in general and in particular formally prove the necessity of n2 keys (if an on-line
server is not employed and we allow any size of user set to collude against a pair
of users).
In [12] it has been proved that two parties cannot establish a common key from
scratch using only one-way permutation based on black-box reductions unless P
can be separated from NP.
Blom’s innovative method is a key distribution for pairs of users which are ID-based
that predated the formal definition of this notion by Shamir [23]. Blom’s technical tool
was MDS linear codes. Later, Matsumoto and Imai [17] extended the work of [3] to
general symmetric functions; they further systematically defined key distribution
schemes based on general functions (our scheme as well as the basic n2 scheme can
actually be viewed as a special case of their general system).
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Inspired by the preliminary version of this work [+], Beimel and Chor [1]
proved that in key distribution schemes where many key are generated, the interac-
tion cannot help in decreasing the size of the pieces of information given to the
users. They also proposed a t-round interactive protocol for k-secure t-conference
key distribution schemes to establish a single conference key: At the expense of an
increase in the round complexity, the user’s information is only 2(t+k&1)t times
the size of the common key.
Fiat and Naor [8] considered a new scenario for key distribution in which a
center gives some predefined keys to users. Later, the center wants to enable a
privileged subset of users to recover a common key in such a way that coalitions
of users that are not in the privileged class have no information on this common
key. The center enables the privileged users to share a key by broadcasting a
message. Leighton and Micali [15] described various approaches to unconditional
secure key distribution schemes which are not based on public-key cryptography or
polynomialinteger arithmetic.
Finally, Blundo and Cresti [4] modelled the problem of unconditionally secure
broadcast encryption schemes with an information theoretic framework giving tight
limitations both on the number of private keys associated with each user and on the
number of keys generated by the server, proving that the unconditional scheme
presented in [8] is optimal.
Organization. In Section 2 we formally define a KDS in terms of the entropy.
In Section 3 we prove the lower bound on the entropy of each user in a k-secure
t-conference KDS. In Section 4 we then describe and analyse an actual optimal
scheme for k-secure t-conference KDS. In Section 5 we show how interaction can
be used to dramatically decrease the amount of information held by each user. In
Section 6 we present an optimal protocol to realize a conference KDS when not all
pairs of users are able to communicate. In Section 7 we present results for the asym-
metric models where the system is comprised of more-trusted users (e.g., servers)
and less-trusted users. In the Appendix we recall the definition of entropy and some
of its properties.
2. THE MODEL
In this section we present the key distribution problem and model. A key distri-
bution scheme distributes some information among a set of users, so that any t of
them can join and generate a secure key. We assume a trusted off-line server active
only at initiation (unlike an on-line server approach put forth in [21] which we call
server-based KDS). As we said, the system is k-secure if any k users, pooling together
their pieces, have no information on keys they should not know. These schemes can be
further classified into two categories: interactive (where users are engaged in a protocol,
prior to usage of the common key) and noninteractive (where keys are generated
privately by the individuals). Next, we formally define non-interactive key distribu-
tion schemes. Our definition of security is based on the notion of entropy and is
thus unconditional.
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A key distribution scheme for a set of users U=[User1 , ..., Usern] consists of a
triple: a matrix M whose columns are indexed by the members of U, a probability
distribution 6 on the rows of M, and a function f. When the server wants to set
up a scheme he randomly chooses according to 6 a row of the matrix M. If the
server chooses the j th row, then he gives the value ui=M( j, i) to user Useri . The
reconstruction function f is a publicly known three-argument function which is used
to noninteractively compute a common conference key. If Useri wants to compute
the common key of the set X[1, ..., n], i # X, then he computes sX= f (ui , i, X ),
where ui is the piece of information received by the server. The function f satisfies
f (ui , i, X )= f (uj , j, X ) if i, j # X.
Let Ui be the set of all possible pieces given to Useri . Given a set X=[i1 , i2 , ..., ir],
where i1<i2< } } } <ir , of elements in [1, 2, ..., n], denote by UX the set Ui1_ } } } _Uir .
The server’s algorithm defines a probability distribution on U1_ } } } _Un , that, in
turn, naturally induces a probability distribution [ pUX (u)]u # UX on UX , for any set
X[1, 2, ..., n]. Let H(UX)=H(Ui1 } } } Uir) be the entropy of the probability distribu-
tion on UX=Ui1_ } } } _Uir .
We denote by SX the set of all possible values of the common key sX . Hence,
SX=[ f (u, i, X ): u # Ui], for any i # X. For any set X[1, 2, ..., n], the probability
distribution on U1_ } } } _Un naturally induces a probability distribution on SX ,
since each Useri deterministically computes the conference key sX from the informa-
tion ui received by the server. Let [ pSX(s)]s # SX be the probability that sX=s and
let H(SX) be its entropy.
The maximum value that the security parameter k can take in any t-conference
KDS for n users is n&t, since any adversary coalition can contain at most n&t
users. Formally, we define a noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution
scheme for n users as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let U be a set of n users and let t and k be nonnegative integers
with k+tn. A noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for U is
a scheme such that
1. Each group of t users can noninteractively compute the common key.
Formally, for all X[1, 2, ..., n] with |X |=t, for all uX # UX with pUX (uX)>0,
a unique secret-key sX exists such that for each user, Useri , i # X, it holds that
p(sX | ui)=1.
2. Any group of k users have no information on any key they should not know.
Formally, for all Y, X[1, 2, ..., n], with |Y |=k, |X |=t, and X & Y=<, for all
uX # UX and uY # UY , with pUY (uY)>0, and for all sX # SX , it holds that p(sX | uY)=
pSX(sX).
Property 1 means that given the value held by the Useril , l=1, 2, ..., t, and the identity
of the other t&1 users, a unique value of the common key exists. Property 2 means
that the probability that the common key among users Useri1 , ..., Userit is sX , where
X=[i1 , ..., it], given the information held by users Userj1 , ..., User jk , where Y=
[ j1 , ..., jk], and X & Y=<, is equal to the a priori probability that the common
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key is sX . This means that random variables SX and UY are statistically independent
and, thus, the values uj1 , ..., ujk reveal no information on the common key sX .
By using the entropy function it is possible to give an equivalent definition of a
noninteractive k-secure t-conference KDS.
Definition 2.2. Let U be a set of n users and let t and k be nonnegative integers
with k+tn. A noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for U
is a scheme such that
1$. Each t user can noninteractively compute the common key. Formally, for
all X[1, 2, ..., n] with |X |=t, and for each Useri , i # X, it holds that H(SX | Ui)=0.
2$. Any group of k users have no information on any key they should not know.
Formally, for all Y, X[1, 2, ..., n], with |Y |=k, |X |=t, and X & Y=<, it holds
that H(SX | UY)=H(SX).
Notice that H(SX | Ui)=0 for each Useri , i # X, means that each set of values
held by the Useri corresponds to a unique value of the common key. In fact, by
definition, H(SX | Ui)=0 is equivalent to the fact that for all ui # Ui , with pUi (ui)>0,
a unique value sX # SX such that p(sX | ui)=1 exists. Moreover, H(SX | UY)=H(SX) is
equivalent to saying that SX and UY are statistically independent; i.e., for all uY # UY ,
with pUY (uY)>0, we have p(sX | uY)= p(sX). Hence the two definitions of noninter-
active KDS are equivalent.
Definition 2.2 does not say anything on the entropies of random variables SX
and SX $ , for different X, X$[1, 2, ..., n], with |X |=|X$|=t. For example, we
could have either H(SX)>H(SX $) or H(SX)H(SX $). Our results apply to the
general case of arbitrary entropies on keys, but for clarity we state our results for
the simpler case that all entropies on keys are equal, i.e., H(SX)=H(SX $). We
denote this common entropy by H(S).
The next simple lemma proves that if a t-conference KDS is k-secure then it is
k$-secure for all integers k$<k.
Lemma 2.3. Let U be a set of n users and let t and k be nonnegative integers with
k+tn. In any noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for U,
for any nonnegative integer k$<k and for all sets X, Y[1, 2, ..., n] with |X |=t,
|Y |=k$, and X & Y=<, it holds that
H(SX | UY)=H(SX).
Proof. Let X$[1, 2, ..., n] be a set such that |X$|=k, X$ & X=<, and Y/X$.
From 2$ of Definition 2.2 we have H(SX)=H(SX | UX$). From Eq. (14) in the
Appendix, one gets
H(SX | UX$)H(SX | UY)H(SX).
Thus, H(SX | UY)=H(SX). K
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From Lemma 2.3 one has that Property 2$ of Definition 2.2 can be equivalently
written as
2". Any group of k$k users have no information on any key they should not
know. Formally, for all Y, X[1, 2, ..., n], with |Y |=k$, |X |=t, and X & Y=<,
it holds that H(SX | UY)=H(SX).
3. LOWER BOUND: CONFERENCE KEY DISTRIBUTION
In this section we prove a lower bound on the size of the user’s information for
a k-secure t-conference KDS.
In a k-secure t-conference KDS the knowledge of k keys does not convey any
information on any other key. This is formalized by the next lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let U be a set of n users and let r, k, and t be integers with k+tn.
Let X, Y1 , ..., Yr , Z[1, 2, ..., n] such that |Z|=k, Z & X=<, Z & Yi {< and
|X |=|Yi |=t, for i=1, ..., r. Then, in any noninteractive k-secure t-conference key
distribution scheme for U it holds that
H(SX |SY1 } } } SYr)=H(SX).
Proof. From Eq. (12) in the Appendix we have H(SX)H(SX | SY1 } } } SYr).
To prove the lemma it is enough to prove that H(SX | SY1 } } } SYr)H(SX).
Since Z & Yi {<, from 1$ of Definition 2.2 we obtain 0H(SY1 } } } SYr | UZ)
ri=1 H(SYi | UZ)=0. Hence, H(SY1 } } } SYr | UZ)=0. From Eq. (15) in the Appendix
we get H(SX | SY1 } } } SYr)H(SX | UZ). Moreover, since Z & X=< and |Z|=k,
from 2$ of Definition 2.2 we obtain H(SX | UZ)=H(SX). Therefore, H(SX | SY1 } } } SYr)
H(SX) which proves the lemma. K
The next theorem states a lower bound on the size of the information held by
each user.
Theorem 3.2. Let U be a set of n users and let k and t be integers with k+tn.
In any noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme, if all entropies
on keys are equal, i.e., H(S)=H(SX) for all X[1, 2, ..., n] and |X |=t, then the
entropy H(Ui) satisfies
H(Ui)\k+t&1t&1 + H(S). (1)
Moreover, if all keys are chosen in sets of the same cardinality, i.e., |S|=|SX | for all
X[1, 2, ..., n] and |X |=t, then, for any user User i it holds that
log |Ui |\k+t&1t&1 + log |S|. (2)
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Proof. Consider the set of indices I=[ j1 , ..., jk+t&1] and an index i such that
i  I. Define set C as C=[ j1 , ..., jk] and set A as A=[i, jk+1 , ..., jk+t&1]. Let m
be the number of different sets Bl constructed by taking the element i along with
any (t&1) elements from the set I, with the exception of [ jk+1 , ..., jk+t&1]. It is
easy to see that there are exactly m=( k+t&1t&1 )&1 such sets, denoted B1 , ..., Bm .
Namely,
Bl # [[i, x1 , ..., xt&1] | x1 , ..., xt&1 # I, [x1 , ..., xt&1]{[ jk+1 , ..., jk+t&1]] .
We have
H(Ui)=H(SB1 } } } SBmSA)&H(SB1 } } } SBm SA | Ui)+H(U i | SB1 } } } SBmSA)
(from Eqs. (10) and (11) in the Appendix)
H(SB1 } } } SBm SA)& :
m
l=1
H(SBl | Ui)&H(SA | U i)+H(Ui | SB1 } } } SBm SA)
(from Eqs. (9) and (14) in the Appendix)
=H(SB1 } } } SBm SA)+H(Ui | SB1 } } } SBm SA) (from 1$ of Definition 2.2)
H(SB1 } } } SBm SA) (from Eq. (8) in the Appendix)
=H(SB1)+H(SB2 | SB1)+ } } } +H(SBm | SB1 } } } SBm&1)+H(SA |SB1 } } } SBm)
(from Eq. (9) in the Appendix)
Sets X=A, Z=C, and Yi=Bi for i=1, ..., m satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 3.1.
Thus, we have H(SA | SB1 } } } SBm)=H(SA). Moreover, for each h, 1hm, sets
X=Bh , Z=I"Bh , and Yi=Bi , for i=1, ..., h&1 satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 3.1.
Thus, H(SBh | SB1 } } } SBh&1)=H(SBh) and
H(Ui)H(SB1)+H(SB2)+ } } } +H(SBm)+H(SA)
=(m+1) H(S)
=\k+t&1t&1 + H(S).
To prove the bound (2) notice that the index i belongs to sets B1 , ..., Bm , and A;
hence, Useri has to compute at least m+1=( k+t&1t&1 ) keys. From Lemma 3.1, the
keys of these conferences are independent. Therefore, supposing that all keys are
chosen in sets of the same cardinality |S|, there are at least |S|(
k+t&1
t&1 ) possible
vectors of keys. Each of these vectors of keys can be a possible vector to be recon-
structed by User i . Hence, |Ui ||S|(
k+t&1
t&1 ) which proves the bound (2). K
Beimel and Chor [1] proved that the lower bound (2) of Theorem 3.2 holds
under weaker assumptions. However, the bound (1) of Theorem 3.2 on the entropy
of each user does not hold in Beimel and Chor’s weaker model. Indeed, consider the
following 1-secure 2-conference key distribution scheme.
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TABLE I
1-Secure 2-Conference KDS
s1, 2 s1, 3 s2, 3 Prob.
0 0 0 1&7=
0 0 1 =
0 1 0 =
0 1 1 =
1 0 0 =
1 0 1 =
1 1 0 =
1 1 1 =
The server chooses a row in Table I, according to the probability distribution
in the last column. The first row is chosen with probalility 1&7=, where 0<=17
and ={18; whereas each other row is chosen with probability =. The server distri-
butes the key si, j to users Useri and Userj . This scheme satisfies the condition of
the weaker model in [1] and meets the bound (2) of Theorem 3.2. One can easily
compute that H(S) ] H(S1, 2)=H(S1, 3)=H(S2, 3)=h(4=) (where h( p)=&p log p
&(1& p) log(1& p) is the binary entropy). We have that H(Ui)=h(4=)+4=+
(1&4=) h(2=(1&4=)), for i=1, 2, 3. It results that H(Ui)<2h(4=)=2H(S) for
0<=0.12. Therefore, in the weaker model of Beimel and Chor [1] the bound (1)
of Theorem 3.2 on the entropy of each user does not hold. This is essentially due
to the fact that Lemma 3.1 under their weaker assumption does not hold.
A particular case of Theorem 3.2 is when t=2 and k=n&2. In this case the key
of a pair of users cannot be computed (even one of its bits cannot be computed)
by an adversary coalition comprised of the other n&2 users. Each user holds at
least n&1 pieces of information of a size equal to the size of the common key. The
total number of pieces of information held by all users is at least n(n&1). This is
the well-known problem of n2 keys. The bound (2) is achieved by the protocol we
propose in Section 4.
4. PROTOCOLS FOR KEY DISTRIBUTION
In this section we design and analyze protocols for k-secure t-conference key
distribution which are applicable to hierarchical KDS as well (as will be later
explained). The scheme we propose when applied to 2-party KDS is a particular
case of Blom’s scheme [3] based on MDS linear codes, and, in particular based on
polynomials.
Blom’s protocol for a k-secure (2-conference) KDS for n users is as follows. Let
G be a (publicly known) generator matrix of a (n, k+1) MDS linear code over
GF(q) (see [16] for definitions and analysis of such codes) and let D be a secret
random matrix with elements in GF(q). From the matrices G and D, construct a
n_n symmetric matrix K whose entries will be the users’ keys. The matrix K is
equal to K=(DG)T G. The information given to Useri consists of the row i of (DG)T.
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If Useri wants to communicate with Userj then he computes the inner product of the
held vector with the column j of G and he obtains the common key si, j=K(i, j ).
We propose the following protocol (to be extended to various other applications
in the following) for a noninteractive k-secure t-conference KDS based on symmetric
polynomials. A polynomial P(x1 , ..., xt)=0 j1 , ..., jtk aj1 , ..., jt (x1)
j1 (x2) j2 } } } (xt) jt
of degree k, where aj1 , ..., jt # GF(q), is said to be symmetric if P(x1 , ..., xt)=
P(x_(1) , ..., x_(t)) for any permutation _: [1, 2, ..., t]  [1, 2, ..., t]. We define an
equivalence relation t on the coefficients of the polynomial P as follows. Two coef-
ficients ai1 , ..., it and aj1 , ..., jt are t equivalent if i1 , ..., it is a permutation of j1 , ..., jt .
In a symmetric polynomial P(x1 , ..., xt) all pairs of t equivalent coefficients are
equal. That is, the coefficient ai1 , ..., it is equal to a_(i1 ), ..., _(it) , for any permutation
_: [i1 , i2 , ..., it]  [i1 , i2 , ..., it]. Note that in a symmetric polynomial in t variables
of degree k the number of all coefficients that are not pairwise t equivalent is equal
to the number of possible ways of choosing with repetitions t elements (corresponding
to indices i1 , ..., it) from a set of k+1 elements (each ij can assume k+1 values).
This number is equal to ( k+tt ). Thus, to randomly choose a symmetric polynomial
in t variables of degree k with coefficients in GF(q) it is enough to randomly select
only ( k+tt ) values from GF(q).
The protocol to realize a noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution
scheme can be found in Fig. 1.
As we mentioned above, when t=2 our scheme is a particular case of Blom’s
scheme. Indeed, the generator matrix G of the MDS code is constructed by setting
the entry G(i, j ) to j i&1.
To prove that the protocol proposed in Fig. 1 realizes a noninteractive k-secure
t-conference key distribution scheme, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let R1(x1 , ..., xl), ..., Rk+1(x1 , ..., xl) be polynomials in l variables of
degree k with coefficients in GF(q) and let y1 , ..., yk+1 be k+1 different values in
GF(q). There exists an unique polynomial Q(x1 , ..., xl+1) in l+1 variables of degree
k with coefficients in GF(q) such that, for i=1, 2, ..., k+1, it holds that Q(x1 , ..., xl , yi)
=Ri (x1 , ..., xl).
FIG. 1. Protocol for noninteractive k-secure t-conferences KDS.
10 BLUNDO ET AL.
Proof. It is simple to show that there exists a polynomial satisfying the
hypothesis of the lemma. Indeed, consider the polynomial Q(x1 , ..., xl+1)=
k+1i=1 (>
k+1
j=1, j{i ((xl+1& y j )( yi& yj))) Ri (x1 , ..., x l). Clearly, for i=1, 2, ...,
k+1, it holds that Q(x1 , ..., xl , y i)=Ri (x1 , ..., xl). Now, we prove that the
polynomial satisfying the hypothesis is unique. The polynomial Q can be rewritten
as Q(x1 , ..., x l+1)=0 j1 , ..., jl+1k aj1 , ..., jl+1(x1)
j1 } } } (x l+1) jl+1. We have that
Ri (x1 , ..., x l)=Q(x1 , ..., xl , yi)=0 j1 , ..., jlk Aj1 , ..., jl , i (x1)
j1 } } } (xl) jl where, for any
0 j1 , ..., jlk and i=1, 2, ..., k+1,
Aj1 , ..., jl , i= :
k
jl+1=0
a j1 , ..., jl , jl+1 ( yi)
jl+1. (3)
If we consider (3) for fixed j1 , ..., jl we have the following linear system of k+1
unknowns (the coefficients aj1 , ..., jl) and k+1 equations
aj1 , ..., jl , 0+a j1 , ..., jl , 1 y1+aj1 , ..., jl , 2( y1)
2+ } } } + aj1 , ..., jl , k( y1)
k = Aj1 , ..., jl , 1
{ aj1 , ..., jl , 0+aj1 , ..., jl , 1y2+aj1 , ..., jl , 2( y2)2+ } } } + aj1 , ..., jl , k( y2)k = Aj1 , ..., jl , 2b baj1 , ..., jl , 0+a j1 , ..., jl , 1yk+1+a j1 , ..., jl , 2( yk+1)2+ } } } +aj1 , ..., jl , k( yk+1)k=Aj1 , ..., jl , k+1.
This can be written in matrix form as follows:
\
1
1
b
1
y1
y2
b
yk+1
( y1)2
( y2)2
b
( yk+1)2
} } }
} } }
} } }
( y1)k
( y2)k
b
( yk+1)k+\
aj1 , ..., jl , 0
aj1 , ..., jl , 1
b
a j1 , ..., jl , k
+=\
Aj1 , ..., jl , 1
Aj1 , ..., jl , 2
b
Aj1 , ..., jl , k+1
+ .
The matrix Y on the left side is a Vandermonde matrix, and its determinant is
det Y= ‘
1m<rk+1
( ym& yr).
The yi ’s are all distinct, so no term ym& yr is equal to 0, and det Y{0. Therefore,
the system has an unique solution over GF(q). By resolving this system, we can
compute the unique coefficients aj1 , ..., jl , 0 , aj1 , ..., jl , 1 , ..., aj1 , ..., jl , k . Thus, for 0 j1 , ..., jlk,
resolving (k+1) l linear systems represented by (3) (a system for each choice of
0 j1 , ..., j lk) we can compute all coefficients aj1 , ..., jl+1 where 0 j1 , ..., jl+1k.
This proves the lemma. K
The following theorem proves that the protocol proposed in Fig. 1 realizes a
noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme.
Theorem 4.2. Protocol 1 is a noninteractive k-secure t-conference key distribu-
tion scheme.
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Proof. It is easy to see that in Protocol 1 any group of t users, say Userj1 , ..., Userjt ,
can compute the same conference key sj1 , ..., jt=P( j1 , ..., jt). Thus, Property 1 of
Definition 2.2 is satisfied. We prove that the scheme realized by Protocol 1 is
k-secure. From Lemma 4.1, any k+1 users can compute all coefficients of the poly-
nomial P(x1 , ..., xt). We will prove that any k users, say Userz1 , ..., Userzk , knowing
the polynomials fz1 , ..., fzk and guessing a conference key s # GF(q) of other t users,
say Userz1$ , ..., Userzt$ , where [z$1 , ..., z$t] & [z1 , ..., zk]=<, can compute the unique
polynomial P$(x1 , ..., xt) such that, for i=1, 2, ..., k, P$(zi , x2 , ..., xt)= fzi (x2 , ..., xt)
and P$(z$1 , ..., z$t)=s. Since the key s can be an arbitrary value in GF(q), the users
Userz1 , ..., Userzk can construct q different polynomials. Since the polynomial P was
uniformly chosen, the q polynomials the users Userz1 , ..., Userzk can construct are
equally likely to be the polynomial P used by the center to set up the scheme.
That is, Pr(Sz1 , ..., zk = s | Uz1 = uz1 } } } Uzk = uzk) = Pr(Sz1 , ..., zk = s), and therefore
H(Sz1 , ..., zk | Uz1 } } } Uzk)=H(Sz1 , ..., zk).
Suppose users Userz1 , ..., Userzk guess a value s # GF(q) for the common key among
Userz$1 , ..., Userz$t , that is, they know P(z$1 , ..., z$t)=s. For i=1, 2, ..., k, Userzi evaluates
the polynomial fzi (x2 , ..., xt) at (x2 , ..., xt)=(z$1 , ..., z$t&1) obtaining P(zi , z$1 , ..., z$t&1)
= yi . Since the polynomial P(x1 , x2 , ..., xt) is symmetric, we have that P(z$1 , ..., z$t&1 , zi)
=P(zi , z$1 , ..., z$t&1)= yi . Hence, the users Userz1 , ..., Userzk know P(z$1 , ..., z$t&1 , z$t)=s
and P(z$1 , ..., z$t&1 , zi)= yi , for i=1, 2, ..., k. Therefore, using Lagrange’s interpolation,
they can compute the unique polynomial P(z$1 , ..., z$t&1 , xt) of degree k in the
variable xt .
Now, for i=1, 2, ..., k, the user Userzi evaluates the polynomial fzi (x2 , ..., xt) at
(x2 , ..., xt&1)=(z$1 , ..., z$t&2) obtaining the polynomial P(zi , z$1 , ..., z$t&2 , xt). Using
the symmetry of P(x1 , x2 , ..., xt), we have P(zi , z$1 , ..., z$t&2 , xt)=P(z$1 , ..., z$t&2 ,
zi , xt). Hence, using the polynomial P(z$1 , ..., z$t&2 , z$t&1 , xt) previously computed
and the polynomials P(z$1 , ..., z$t&2 , zi , xt), the users Userz1 , ..., Userzk can compute
the polynomial P(z$1 , ..., z$t&2 , xt&1 , xt) of degree k in the variables xt&1 and x&t
as shown in Lemma 4.1. Iterating the previous argument t&3 times, the users
Userz1 , ..., Userzk can compute the polynomial P(z$1 , x2 , ..., xt) which is the polyno-
mial fz$1(x2 , ..., xt) known by the user Userz$1 . At this point users Userz1 , ..., Userzk
know the k+1 polynomials fz1 , ..., fzk , fz$1 and from Lemma 4.1, they can construct
the unique polynomial P$(x1 , ..., xt) such that, for i=1, 2, ..., k, P$(zi , x2 , ..., xt)=
fzi (x2 , ..., xt), P$(z$1 , x2 , ..., xt)= fz$1(x2 , ..., xt), and P(z$1 , ..., z$t )=s. K
The scheme proposed meets the bound provided by Theorem 3.2, when all coef-
ficients are uniformly chosen. Indeed, in a symmetric polynomial P(x1 , ..., xr) the
coefficient ai1, ..., ir is equal to a_(i1), ..., _(ir) , for all permutations _: [i1 , i2 , ..., ir] 
[i1 , i2 , ..., ir]. Thus, the number of coefficients of a symmetric polynomial in r
variables of degree k is equal to the number of possible ways of choosing with
repetitions r elements (corresponding to indices i1 , ..., ir) from a set of k+1
elements (each ij can assume k+1 values). This is equal to ( k+rr ).
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5. NONINTERACTIVE VERSUS INTERACTIVE SCHEMES
In Section 3 we proved that in a noninteractive k-secure t-conference KDS, for
each Useri it holds that H(Ui)( k+t&1t&1 ) H(S). In this section we prove that if we
allow interaction among users (not with the server!) to set up a common key, then
the lower bound can be beaten! We extend the definitions of Section 2 to interactive
key distribution schemes and present a protocol that realizes an interactive k-secure
t-conference KDS. A non-interactive scheme is an interactive scheme in which there
is no interaction among the users.
In fact, for our purposes it suffices to define schemes with very little interaction,
which we call one-round interactive KDS. In one-round interactive KDS, each user
Useri getssends a single message #i fromto other users, based on the users’ keys.
Let 1i be the set of all possible values of #i . Given a set X=[i1 , i2 , ..., ir], where
i1<i2< } } } <ir , of elements in [1, 2, ..., n], denote by 1X the set 1i1_ } } } _1ir .
The server’s algorithm and the users’ algorithms define a probability distribution on
11_ } } } _1n , that, in turn, naturally induces a probability distribution [ p1X (#)]# # 1X
on 1X , for any set X[1, 2, ..., n]. Let H(1X)=H(1i1 } } } 1ir) be the entropy of the
probability distribution on 1X=1i1_ } } } _1ir .
Formally, following the information theoretical approach of Section 2, we define
an interactive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme for n users as follows.
Definition 5.1. Let U be a set of n users and let t and k be nonnegative integers
with k+tn. A one-round interactive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme
for U is a scheme such that
1. Each t user can interactively (after one-round exchange of messages among
the t users) compute the common key. Formally, for all X[1, 2, ..., n] with |X |=t,
and for each Useri , i # X, it holds that H(SX | Ui1i)=0.
2. Any group of k users have no information on any key they should not know.
Formally, for all Y, X[1, 2, ..., n], with |Y |=k, |X |=t, and X & Y=<, it holds
that H(SX | UY 1X)=H(SX).
It is easy to see that the noninteractive model is a particular case of the inter-
active one. However, note a few issues of practical nature which are not covered by
the definition. Since we now allow interaction, there are new ‘‘active’’ attacks on
this interactive stage; e.g., an attacker may send forged messages to some users. Our
definition does not preclude such active attacks (similar to an active attack on the
system when in use for, say, message exchange). Allowing authentication codes (which
may double the message size) may solve such attacks by outsiders. Furthermore, note
that the definition does not permit the users to repeat the computation of the common
key (interactively) twice. Namely, once computed, a conference key has to be remem-
bered by the conference. We do not consider a system where forgetting a key and allow-
ing recomputation are allowed. Another immediate possible extension is to allow many
rounds in the interactive key computation.
Now we illustrate a protocol realizing a one-round interactive k-secure t-conference
KDS. First, we construct a noninteractive (k+t&2)-secure 2-conference KDS using
the protocol presented in Section 4. For any pair of users, the common key will be a
randomly chosen element of GF(q). Then, given a group of t users that want to
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compute a conference key, the user with the largest identity in the group chooses
as conference key a random value in GF(q). Finally, the user with the largest identity
in the group sends this value to the other t&1 users by using the noninteractive
(k+t&2)-secure 2-conference KDS. Recall that #i denotes the message received
sent by Useri .
More formally protocol 2 for parties User1 , ...Usern can be seen in Fig. 2 (based
on the scheme presented above). To simplify the notation, in case of noninteractive
k-secure 2-conference KDS for n users, for any set X[1, 2, ..., n] consisting of two
elements, X=[i, j], i< j, we denote the key sX either with si, j or with sj, i , and the
set of common keys SX either with Si, j or with Sj, i (i.e., SX=Si, j=Sj, i).
Protocol 2 realizes an interactive k-secure t-conference KDS since the KDS that
is established is (k+t&2)-secure, as we prove in the next theorem.
In this protocol only t+k&1 elements of GF(q) are distributed by the server and
kept by each user. This proves a separation between the interactive and the nonin-
teractive case for informationtheoretically key distribution schemes for dynamic
conferences.
In protocol 2, the message #i , for i=1, 2, ..., t&1, used by Useri , to set up the
common key s, is equal to #i=st, is. Let S be the set of all possible secret keys.
The next theorem holds.
Theorem 5.2. Protocol 2 realises a one-round interactive k-secure t-conference
key distribution scheme.
Proof. Without loss of generality let User1 , ..., Usert be the users that want to
set up a common key. Let X=[1, 2, ..., t] be a set in [1, 2, ..., n]. Let Y be a set
FIG. 2. Protocol for one-time interactive k-secure t-conference KDS.
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in [1, 2, ..., n], with |Y |=k, such that Y & [1, 2, ..., t]=<. It is easy to see that
the scheme realized by Protocol 2 satisfies Property 1 of Definition 5.1. Thus, to
prove that the scheme realized by Protocol 2 is k-secure we have to prove that
H(SX | UY 11 } } } 1t)=H(SX).
Since the secret key s # SX is independently chosen from uY # UY , then H(SX | UY)
=H(SX). Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
H(SX | UY11 } } } 1t)=H(SX | UY).
Note that in Protocol 2 we have H(SX | UY11 } } } 1t)=H(SX | UY11 } } } 1t&1). In
fact, it is easy to see that the set of all possible communication 1t of Usert is
determined by the union of the sets 11 , ..., 1t&1 , since the message sent by Usert
consists of all the messages received by participants User1 , ..., Usert&1 . Thus, to
prove the theorem is sufficient to show that H(SX | UY11 } } } 1t&1)=H(SX | UY).
One way of showing that H(SX | UY 11 } } } 1t&1)=H(SX | UY) is to prove that
I(SX ; 11 } } } 1t&1 | UY)=0.
First, we prove that
H(St, 1 ...St, t&1 | UY)= :
t&1
j=1
H(St, j ). (4)
Indeed, by Eq. (9) in the Appendix we have
H(St, 1 } } } St, t&1 | UY)=H(St, 1 | UY)+ :
t&1
j=2
H(St, j | UY St, 1 } } } St, j&1).
By Definition 2.2 we have H(Si, j | Ui)=0. Thus, from Eq. (15) in the Appendix, one
has
H(St, 1 } } } St, t&1 | UY)H(St, 1 | UY)+ :
t&1
j=2
H(St, j | UY U1 } } } U j&1)= :
t&1
j=1
H(St, j).
The last equality holds since |Y |k and Protocol 2 uses a polynomial of degree
k+t&2. Therefore, k+t&2 users have no information on keys they should not
know. On the other hand, by Eqs. (9) and (12) in the Appendix one finds
H(St, 1 } } } St, t&1 | UY) :
t&1
j=1
H(St, j).
Hence, Eq. (4) is proved. From Eqs. (9) and (12) in the Appendix one has
H(11 } } } 1t&1 | UY) :
t&1
j=1
H(1j).
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Since si, j # Si, j and s # SX are independent and uniformly chosen and since adding
S to the keys in GF( q) preserves the entropy of the t&1 keys (after addition), we
have
H(11 , ..., 1t&1 | SX)=H(St, 1 } } } St, t&1) (5)
and H(1j)=H(St, j), and thus
H(11 } } } 1t&1 | UY) :
t&1
j=1
H(St, j). (6)
From Eq. (13) in the Appendix it follows that
I(11 } } } 1t&1 ; SX | UY)=H(11 } } } 1t&1 | UY)&H(11 } } } 1t&1 | UYSX)
 :
t&1
j=1
H(St, j)&H(St, 1 } } } St, t&1 | UY) (from (5) and (6))
= :
t&1
j=1
H(St, j)& :
t&1
j=1
H(St, j) (from (4))
=0.
Since the mutual information is nonnegative, from Eq. (11) in the Appendix we
have that I(SX ; 11 } } } 1t&1 | UY)=0. Hence the theorem is proved. K
6. CONFERENCE KEY DISTRIBUTION AND COMMUNICATION GRAPH
In a noninteractive 2-conference KDS for n users each pair of users is able to
compute a common key. It can be the case that some pairs of users will never need
to compute a common key. In this section we explore the possibility of using
smaller pieces of information for users by exploiting such known structures of the
possible conferences. Note that our goal here is to improve efficiency rather than
security.
This situation can arise when a computer network has a topology which is not
the complete graph; here each computer takes the place of a user in a KDS, and
two computers can communicate if and only if there is a link between them. As an
example, consider a ring of n computers R=[C0 , C1 , ..., Cn&1]: computer C i can
communicate directly with only two computers, Ci&1 and Ci+1 (arithmetic on
indices is modulo n) so it will never need to compute a common key with Ci+2 ,
for example. We do not allow communication via other computers in the above
example; in many situations the communication is restricted a priori as in this
example. In this section we analyse this case.
Let U=[User1 , ..., Usern] be a set of participants (users). A communication structure
C is a subset of U6U. The communication structure contains all pairs of users for which
the server has to provide a common key. A convenient way to represent a communica-
tion structure is by a graph G, in which each vertex Useri corresponds to Useri , and
there is an edge [Useri , Userj] if and only if (Useri , Userj) or (Userj , Useri) belongs
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to C. We call the graph associated to a communication structure the communication
graph.
Definition 2.2 can be extended to a key distribution scheme for any communica-
tion structure C, as follows.
Definition 6.1. Let U be a set of n users, let k be a nonnegative integer with
k+2n, and let CU6U be a communication structure. A noninteractive k-secure
2-conference key distribution scheme for C is a scheme such that
1. Each pair of users in C can noninteractively compute the common key. For
all (Useri , Userj) # C it holds that H(Si, j | Ui)=H(Si, j | Uj)=0.
2. Any group of k users have no information on any key they should not
know. For all sets Y[1, 2, ..., n] with |Y |=k and indices i, j # [1, 2..., n]"Y it
holds that H(Si, j | UY)=H(Si, j).
Now we describe a k-secure (2-conference) KDS for a communication structure C.
First, we do not take into account the communication structure and construct a
k-secure KDS for all users as if each pair has to compute a common key. Useri
could receive more information than needed. If the degree of vertex Useri in the
communication graph is less than k, then the piece of information given to Useri
could consist of only the actual keys he needs for communicating.
In Fig. 3 we describe a noninteractive k-secure key distribution scheme (Protocol
3) for a communication structure C, where deg(Useri) denotes the cardinality of
the set [Userj | (Useri , Userj) # C].
Theorem 6.2. Protocol 3 realizes a noninteractive k-secure 2-conference key
distribution for any communication structure C.
It is easy to see that in Protocol 3 each Useri receives min[k+1, deg(Useri)]
pieces of information; that is, the size of the information he has is min[k+1,
deg(Useri)] the size of the common key. The following theorem proves that
Protocol 3 is optimal with respect to the size of the information held by each user.
In the following theorem we suppose that all keys have the same entropy; i.e.,
H(Si, j)=H(S) for all i and j.
FIG. 3. Protocol for noninteractive k-secure KDS for a communication structure C.
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Theorem 6.3. Let U be a set of users n, let k be a known integer with k+2n,
and let G be a communication graph on U. In any noninteractive k-secure 2-con-
ference key distribution scheme for G, the entropy H(Ui ) satisfies
H(Ui)+ } H(S),
where +=min[k+1, deg(ui)].
Proof. Let [Useri , Userj1], ..., [Useri , Userj+] be elements of the communication
structure described by graph G. That is, the server has to provide a common key for
such pairs of users. Since 0H(Si, j1 } } } Si, j+ | Ui)
+
l=1 H(Si, jl | Ui)=0, from Eq. (16)
in the Appendix one has
H(Ui)H(S i, j1 } } } Si, j+)
=H(S i, j1 )+H(S i, j2 | Si, j1 )+ } } } +H(Si, j+ | Si, j1 } } } S i, j+&1 )
(from Eq. (9) in the Appendix)
=H(S i, j1 )+H(S i, j2 )+ } } } +H(S i, j+ ) (from Lemma 3.1)
=+H(S). K
Analogously to KDSs, in t-conference KDS we can consider the case when not all
the t-tuples of users need to set up a common key. Let U=[User1 , ..., Usern] be
a set of users. A t-communication structure Ct is a subset of Ut. The communication
structure contains all t-tuples of users for which the protocol has to provide a con-
ference key. A convenient way to represent a t-communication structure is by an
hypergraph H in which each vertex Useri corresponds to Useri and there is a
hyperedge (Useri1 , ..., Userit) if and only if (Useri1 , ..., Userit) # Ct . We will call the
hypergraph associated with a t-communications tructure the communication hyper-
graph. Definition 6.1, Protocol 3, and Theorem 6.3 can be easily extended to a key
distribution scheme for any t-communication structure Ct .
7. THE ASYMMETRIC MODEL
In this section we consider the case when two parties in a network must be
considered to be of a different type (e.g., one party is a server, the other is a client).
We show how this case can be considered as a particular case of the symmetric
model, from the point of view of the efficiency of the result. Note that there may
be security objectives also to the classification of users to different kinds; e.g., we
may trust servers more than we trust usersthese aspects are not considered here.
Let U=[User1 , ..., Usern+m] be a set of users. These users are divided into two
sets: the set A=[User1 , ..., Usern] of system-servers and the set B=[Usern+1 , ...,
Usern+m] of clients. An asymmetric key distribution scheme distributes some infor-
mation among system-servers and clients in such a way that any pair consisting of
a client and a system-server can generate a common secure key. This is called the
asymmetric KDS for n system-servers and m clients. In an asymmetric KDS a
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system-server is not able to claim to be a client nor is a client able to claim to be
a system-server. We say that the scheme is k-secure if any k entities (clients, system-
servers, or both), pooling together their pieces, have no information on keys they
should not know. When we want to distinguish between a system-server and a
client we denote with Ai the information received by Useri # A, for i=1, 2, ..., n,
while with B j we denote the information received by Userj # B, for j=n+1,
n+2, ..., n+m. The maximum value that the security parameter k can take is
n+m&2 since any adversary coalition can contain at most n+m&2 entities.
The asymmetric model can be viewed as a particular case of the symmetric
model, since it can be represented by a communication graph G for a 2-conference
key distribution scheme. In this case the graph G is a complete bipartite graph
where each vertex in the graph G is an entity in the scheme, and each edge of G
joins a system-server and a client. The set of vertices of G is equal to V(G)=A _ B,
the sets A and B are the parts of the complete bipartite graph. The set of edges is equal
to E(G)=[(Useri , Userj) | Useri # A, Userj # B]. We can apply to this case the
analysis for the communication graph (see Section 6). In addition, the protocol shown
in Section 6 can be used for the asymmetric case.
The next corollary gives a lower bound on the size of user’s information in the
asymmetric model. Its proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 6.3, so it is
omitted.
Crollary 7.1. Let A be a set of n system-servers, let B be a set of m clients,
and let k be an integer with k+2n+m. In any asymmetric k-secure key distri-
bution scheme for A and B, the entropy H(Ai) satisfies
H(Ai)+ } H(S),
where +=min[m, k+1], while the entropy H(Bi) satisfies
H(Bi)’ } H(S), where ’=min[n, k+1].
8. OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper we have presented a protocol for one-round interactive KDS to
establish a single conference key in which the user’s information is only t+k&1
times the size of the common key. An open problem is whether the size of the user’s
information can be decreased in a one-round key distribution scheme.
Beimel and Chor [1] proposed a t-round interactive KDS in which the user’s
information is only 2(t+k&1)t times the size of the common key. An interesting
area for further research is to analyse the trade-off between round complexity and
user’s space requirements.
The interactive KDSs we constructed is good only for a single conference key.
To construct an interactive KDS in which it is possible to establish l conference
keys we can simply use l independent copies of an interactive KDS for a single
conference. Can we do better?
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we review the information theoretic concepts we used in this
paper. For a complete treatment of the subject the reader is advised to consult [6].
Given a probability distribution [ p(x)]x=X on a finite set X, we define the entropy
of X, H(X ), as
H(X )=& :
x=X
p(x) log p(x)
(all logarithms in this paper are of base 2). The entropy H(X ) is a measure of the
average information content of the elements in X or, equivalently, a measure of the
average uncertainty one has about which element of the set X has been chosen
when the choices of the elements from X are made according to the probability
distribution [ p(x)]x=X . The entropy enjoys the following property
0H(X )log |X |, (7)
where H(X )=0 if and only if there exists x0 # X such that p(x0)=1; H(X )=log |X |
if and only if p(x)=1|X |, \x # X.
Given two finite sets X and Y and a joint probability distribution
[ p(x, y)]x # X, y # Y on their cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(X |Y ), also
called the equivocation of X given Y, is defined as
H(X |Y )=& :
y # Y
:
x # X
p( y) p(x | y) log p(x | y),
where p(x | y) is the conditional probability of x given y. The conditional
entropy can be written as H(X |Y )=y=Y p( y) H(X | Y=y), where H(X | Y= y)=
&x=X p(x | y) log p(x | y) can be interpreted as the average uncertainty one has
about which element of X has been chosen when the choices are made according
to the probability distribution [ p(x | y)]x # X , that is, when it is known that the
value chosen from the set Y is y. From the definition of conditional entropy it is
easy to see that
H(X | Y )0. (8)
If we have n+1 sets X1 , ..., Xn , Y and a probability distribution on their cartesian
product, the conditional entropy H(X1X2 } } } Xn | Y ) of the joint space X1 X2 } } } Xn
given Y is defined as
H(X1X2 } } } Xn | Y )=H(X1 | Y )+H(X2 | X1 Y )+ } } } +H(Xn | X1 X2 } } } Xn&1Y ).
(9)
The mutual information I(X; Y ) between X and Y is defined by
I(X; Y )=H(X )&H(X | Y ) (10)
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and enjoys the properties
I(X; Y )=I(Y; X ), (11)
and
I(X; Y )0,
from which one gets
H(X )H(X |Y ), (12)
with equality if and only if X and Y are independent. Given sets X, Y, Z and a joint
probability distribution on their cartesian product, the conditional mutual informa-
tion I(X; Y | Z) between X and Y given Z can be written as
I(X; Y | Z)=H(X | Z)&H(X | ZY )=H(Y | Z)&H(Y | ZX ). (13)
Since the conditional mutual information I(X; Y | Z) is always nonnegative we get
H(X | Z)H(X | ZY ). (14)
Let X, Y, and Z be three random variables. If H(Y | Z)=0 then from (13) and
(14) it follows that
H(X | Z)H(X | Y ) (15)
and
H(Z)H(Y ). (16)
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